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Työssä käytiin läpi miehittämättömien ilma-aluksien erilaisia tyyppejä ja niiden käyttä-
mää tekniikkaa mukaan lukien uusimmat turvallisuutta parantavat järjestelmät. Kat-
selmus uusimmista tutkimuksia miehittämättömän ilmailun turvallisuudesta sisälsi 
uusimpien törmäys testien tulokset, jotka pohjustivat tämän työn luotaavaa kyselytut-
kimusta Suomessa vuonna 2016 toimineista miehittämättömän ilmailun operaattoreista 
ja heidän toiminnastaan. Tavoite oli saada selville uutta tietoa miehittämättömän ilmai-
lun toiminnasta ja siihen liittyvistä riskeistä Suomessa, koska kyseistä tietoa ei ole ollut 
saatavilla riittävästi tai tarpeeksi luotettavassa muodossa aikaisemmin. Ilmailun turval-
lisuuden mittaamisessa käytetään vakiintuneita arvoja, jotka on muodostettu vuosittai-
sista toiminnan tilastotiedoista. Tässä työssä kerättiin miehittämättömän ilmailun tur-
vallisuuden mittaamiseen tarvittavia yleisen toiminnan tilastoja. 
 
Kyselytutkimuksen avulla kerätyistä tilastoista selvitettiin arviot onnettomuus ja törmä-
ys todennäköisyyksistä miehittämättömille ilma-aluksille Suomessa, joita voidaan ver-
tailla jatkossa vuosittain turvallisuustilanteen kehittymisen seuraamiseksi. Kerätyistä 
tilastoista selvitettiin myös miehittämättömien ilma-aluksien teknisten vikojen toden-
näköisyydet ja yleisimmät vikojen tyypit. Teknisten vikojen sekä törmäysten todennä-
köisyyksien arviota voidaan käyttää Suomessa miehittämättömien ilma-aluksien ope-
raatioiden riskiarvioiden tekemiseen. Työssä tehtiin myös analyysi erilaisista miehittä-
mättömän ilmailun toimintamuodoista kaikista riskialteimman toiminnan tunnistami-
seksi. 
 
Tämän työn tuloksia voidaan käyttää Suomalaisen miehittämättömän ilmailun koko-
naisturvallisuuden arvioinnissa ja miehittämättömän ilmailun lainsäädännön kehittä-
misessä. Nykyinen miehittämättömän ilmailun ilmailumääräys on luotu tilanteessa, 
jossa tämän työn keräämää turvallisuus tilastoa ei ollut saatavilla. Tällä työllä pyritään 
aloittamaan miehittämättömän ilmailun turvallisuustilanteen sekä yleisen toiminnan 
seuranta ja tilastointi Suomessa. 
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Abstract 
 
This work explored different unmanned aircraft types and the technology they use in-
cluding the latest safety systems. A review of research on unmanned aircraft safety was 
conducted and the latest collision test results were summarized. The results of the latest 
research were a base from where a survey for all unmanned aircraft operators who flew 
in Finland during 2016 was conducted. The goal of the survey was to find out new in-
formation of unmanned aircraft operations in Finland and the risks associated with 
those operations, because this information was not available before in reliable enough 
form. Aviation safety is measured using statistics of past yearly activity and this study 
aimed at gathering the necessary statistics of unmanned aviation in Finland to calculate 
these safety metrics.   
 
 The gathered statistics of general unmanned aviation activity were used to find out ac-
cident and crash probabilities in Finland. Technical fault probability was also surveyed 
and the most common technical fault types. All of these probabilities can be used when 
conducting risk assessment of unmanned aircraft operations. This work also assessed 
different aerial work types to measure which one is the riskiest. 
 
Results from this work can be used in assessing the total risk level of unmanned aviation 
in Finland and the development of regulations. the current aviation act regulating un-
manned aviation in Finland was drafted in a situation where there was no safety statis-
tics of unmanned aviation. This work aims to start the gathering of general and safety 
statistics of unmanned aviation in Finland. 
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1 Introduction 
Unmanned aviation has been around for a long time. The very first unmanned aircraft were 
not similar to the unmanned aircraft that people would identify these days. The V1 flying 
bomb for example was an early unmanned aircraft, but it was controlled by a mechanical 
set of gyroscopes, altimeters and pendulums and had no remote controls. First unmanned 
aircraft that we would recognise as a remotely piloted aircraft system started to be used 
around the Vietnam War, but these were large and expensive aircraft operated by US mili-
tary. Later in the 1980’s radio technology had advanced enough to make designs of much 
smaller unmanned aircraft possible. Around this time Israel started to be the nation leading 
development of small unmanned aircraft, but all of these were still being designed for mili-
tary use. With the growth of processing power and after the invention of first smartphones 
the necessary technology and miniaturized components had become orders of magnitude 
less expensive than before enabling the commercial unmanned aircraft market. The early 
development of unmanned aircraft closely mimicked the history of manned aircraft. Un-
manned aircraft have transformed from recognisance platforms to strike platforms and now 
finally to the civilian market after some decades of development in military use.  
 
During the last couple of years unmanned aircraft have become very popular around the 
world due to their ease of use and rapid decrease in their cost. Civilian unmanned aircraft 
are mostly used for taking videos or photos, but the possible applications are almost end-
less. Unmanned aircraft have several advantages that make them superior in many opera-
tions to manned aircraft. Simply the cost benefit of being able to perform missions with 
significantly smaller aircraft and no crew is the major driver of demand for the market. 
Also operations that are dull, dirty or dangerous are better to be performed with an un-
manned system. These advantages are driving the demand for unmanned aircraft and both 
the civilian and military market is growing very rapidly. The worldwide unmanned aircraft 
market was valued at approximately 1 billion US dollars in 2016 and it is projected to grow 
at a steady 17,5% annual growth rate until 2024 (ESTICAST Research & consulting, 2017) 
when it will have more than tripled in size. This rapid growth is causing a lot of pressure 
for aviation authorities to find ways to safely integrate unmanned aircraft into the common 
airspace. 
 
The growth in the numbers of unmanned aircraft systems has led to safety concerns regard-
ing unmanned aircraft colliding with other aircraft or falling on people. This concern is 
raised mostly by pilots and air traffic controllers who have witnessed close encounters of 
manned aircraft and small unmanned aircraft around aerodromes. The number of occur-
rence reports from these encounters is rising rapidly around the world and has alarmed all 
the aviation authorities. Most countries have created strict legislations limiting the legal 
use of unmanned aircraft significantly with the idea that until the true associated risks are 
known it is better to be conservative. Finland is one of the outlier countries that sees more 
potential than threat in unmanned aircraft and has created very liberal rules for unmanned 
aviation when compared to most other countries. A good argument against the fear of un-
manned aircraft is the actual accident record. There are only a handful of cases worldwide 
where unmanned or model aircraft have collided with manned aircraft. This fact shows that 
even though the risk is rising it is still low when compared for example to bird strikes that 
happen just in USA, Canada and UK together around 1700 times a year (EASA, 2008). 
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Finnish legislation regarding unmanned aviation was introduced for the first time in Sep-
tember of 2015 to address this growing concern regarding unmanned aircraft. While the 
new aviation act OPS M1-32 (Finnish Transport Safety Agency, 2016) on “use of remotely 
piloted aircraft and model aircraft” was being drafted, there was very little knowledge or 
statistics available of actual UAS activity and the associated risks. During the preparations 
of OPS M1-32 Trafi conducted a safety assessment (Finnish Transport Safety Agency, 
2015) according to the Airline Risk Management Solutions (ARMS) model which relies 
heavily on expert judgements of risk. This was the only possible method since there was no 
statistics available at that time. Aviation authorities around the world have a great need for 
more statistics of unmanned aviation to aid their decision making and this is also true in 
Finland. To allow more demanding and risky unmanned operations it is necessary to gather 
statistical data on the risk levels of operations. 
 
The possibility to start gathering data of unmanned aviation in Finland opened up only 
after the aviation act OPS M1-32 (Finnish Transport Safety Agency, 2016) was imple-
mented, since the legislation required RPAS operators who perform aerial work to make a 
notification to Finnish aviation authority before starting operations and to keep a log of all 
flights. From this register of operators it is impossible to find detailed enough information 
of any actual flights, but the possibility to conduct a survey opened up. Therefore, in this 
thesis a survey was conducted by sending a questionnaire to all the unmanned aircraft op-
erators in the Finnish register asking about their flight activities in Finland during the year 
2016. A literature search was also performed to find out the latest studies of risks related to 
unmanned aircraft systems. Additional knowledge gained from this thesis is aimed to help 
Finnish aviation authority to focus its resources on the most relevant UAS activities and to 
get evidence to back up further decisions when designing integration of unmanned aircraft 
into the air space. 
 
In the design of this survey the aim was to find answers to the following research ques-
tions. 
1. How many UAS flights are flown annually in Finland? 
2. Where are these flights flown? 
3. What are the most typical UAS flight operations? 
4. How many incident, occurrences or accidents happen annually with UAS? 
5. What are the leading types of incident, occurrences or accidents? 
6. How reliable different UAS types are? 
7. What factors correlate most with incidents, occurrences or accidents? 
8. What type of UAS activity has the greatest associated risks? 
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2 Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is the currently most appropriate term being used to de-
scribe aircraft that have no pilots on board. Previously Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
was the more commonly used term, but UAS has the benefit of also including all the re-
quired subsystems such as the control station. In Finland the current aviation act (Finnish 
Transport Safety Agency, 2015) uses terms Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) to 
make it clear that autonomous UAS are not included. Also the term model aircraft in the 
Finnish aviation act describes RPAS that are being used only for hobby or sporting purpos-
es. The media commonly uses drone as a term even though this encompasses much more 
than just UAS. The world of unmanned aircraft is still so young that normal citizens who 
are not well versed in the details of the industry have difficulties understanding and finding 
the right words to describe UAS. 
2.1 Basic types of UAS designs 
There are almost endless numbers of different designs of UAS as the remotely piloted na-
ture allows far faster development of new designs and there is no risk to test pilots lives. 
Military UAS are often larger in size than civilian UAS and also fixed wing aircraft are 
more common than multi-copters. However, this thesis focuses only on risks from the ci-
vilian UAS operations and the civilian market is dominated by small battery electric multi-
copters manufactured largely by a few leading companies. There are also endless numbers 
of small civilian UAS manufacturers, but their market share of sold products is small. The 
large leading manufacturers focus on the small scale UAS and the heavier end of the mar-
ket has more even competition between manufacturers (Glaser, 2017). 
2.1.1 Multi-copter and helicopter UAS 
Typical multi-copters sold to hobby users or photographers are small quadcopters weigh-
ing somewhere around 1kg to 3kg (Finnish Tranport Safety Agency, 2017). These UAS are 
at the cheapest end of the market not including toys weighing below 250g. Multi-copters 
used for professional filming, mapping or inspections usually are designed to have more 
redundant systems to increase their reliability and fault tolerance. Therefore, many of the 
larger multi-copters aimed at professionals have six or eight electric motors and weigh 
anywhere from around 5kg up to the commonly regulated maximum mass threshold of 
25kg. The heavier weight is a byproduct of enabling more diverse payloads on the higher 
end professional multi-copters. Some multi-copters weigh even more than 25kg, but these 
systems start to diverge from the common battery electric systems to more varied designs 
in their technical solutions such as fuel cell power sources and all sorts of hybrid electric 
systems.  
 
Due to higher cost of larger helicopter type UAS designs they are more likely to be of a 
traditional large single rotor or counter rotating design. The higher cost of a larger UAS 
allows using designs that would not be economical in the cheapest categories, but using 
these solutions also offers better payload and endurance. When a design is optimized for 
high payload capacity and endurance the power source changes from the simple battery 
electric systems to more power dense solutions. Currently many of the largest commercial 
helicopter type UAS are designed to have a maximum take of weight (MTOW) of less than 
150kg to avoid the EASA certification requirement from EU regulation (European 
Parliament and Council, 2008).  
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2.1.2 Fixed-wing UAS 
Fixed-wing UAS are less common in the civilian market because current rules do not allow 
Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) flights that could be planned quickly and the typi-
cal operator usually has no need for longer flight times. Also the lack of Vertical Take-Off 
and landing (VTOL) capability limits use of fixed-wing UAS in urban areas where there 
isn’t enough space to launch. However in the special cases where longer loitering time is 
needed or BVLOS flights are conducted a fixed-wing UAS has clear advantage in speed 
and endurance over helicopters just like their manned counter parts. For example BVLOS 
inspections of oil and gas pipes are usually conducted with fixed-wing UAS and border 
guards also prefer the longer range and better endurance of fixed wing designs when con-
ducting surveillance missions. Smaller fixed-wing UAS can be launched simply by throw-
ing, but some larger systems need a runway or a catapult for launches. The larger fixed-
wing UAS use more often internal combustion engines to extend their range and endur-
ance. However, the longest endurance is achieved by solar powered fixed-wing UAS rep-
resenting a new type of aircraft at the largest end of civilian UAS market. The current 
world record holder aircraft for flight endurance is Airbus Zephyr S with a flight lasting 
two weeks. These new solar powered long endurance UAS are designed to be used as re-
placements of communications satellites or as surveillance aircraft that can stay over an 
area for weeks or months.  
2.1.3 Hybrid VTOL UAS 
Unmanned aircraft have made experimentation of novel concepts easier due to the low cost 
of building demonstrators when compared to manned aircraft. Many of these new concepts 
try to combine the benefits of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to offer platforms that are 
more versatile than either (Tyan, 2017). There are many ways of achieving a VTOL capa-
bility, but common to most is the use of multiple electric motors to achieve a vertical take-
off and then easy shut down of these take-off motors during forward flight with only one 
active pusher propeller. This type of concept has been showcased by Amazon for package 
delivery. Other way to design a hybrid fixed-wing VTOL aircraft is to design some form of 
a tiltwing or tiltrotor aircraft where the same engines or motors can be used for both verti-
cal take-off and forward flight. One example of a tiltwing UAS is DHL’s Parcelcopter 3. 
 
Figure 1 Example of a hybrid VTOL UAS (Tyan, 2017) 
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2.1.4 Other types of designs 
A said before there are almost endless amounts of different UAS concepts, but the three 
different types above encompass a large amount of the market. Some rarer types are air-
ships, balloons and rockets. Although an argument could be made that weather balloons 
have for a long time been a very common type of UAS, but they are not controllable and 
are not regulated by the Finnish aviation act regarding RPAS. There are some UAS opera-
tors in Finland using airships and some hobby rocket builders. Airships are very useful for 
long duration loitering for advertising or surveillance. Amazon has patented a design for an 
airship that acts as a floating warehouse dispatching smaller UAS to deliver packages. 
Whether this patent actually will become a reality or not, existing airship UAS have their 
place in the market. Likely the most expensive unmanned aircraft in the world is the Boe-
ing X-37 spaceplane a mysterious vehicle that is launched to earth orbit with a rocket and 
then lands at an airport like the space shuttle. There are also many more different types of 
UAS such as the bird mimicking flapping wing Nano Hummingbird by AeroVironment. 
2.2 Problems of categorization 
There are all sizes and shapes of unmanned aircraft and categorizing them is very difficult 
to do in a way that is meaningful from many perspectives. Militaries often use terms such 
as Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE), High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE), 
strategic UAS and tactical UAS (Kimon P. Valavanis, 2015) (Gupta, 2013). All of these 
categories are not useful for describing civilian unmanned aircraft. Some have categorized 
UAS according to their weight (Kimon P. Valavanis, 2015). This has the benefit of being 
simple and easy to understand, but it does not capture the purpose or flight dynamics of a 
UAS. From a safety perspective there is a big difference between a 3kg UAS that is hover-
ing at 10m height and a 3kg UAS flying at 100km/h at 10m height. Some have suggested 
creating categories according to impact energy levels to take into account the speeds of a 
UAS. The problem that arises from this approach is defining how you calculate the impact 
energy and the fact that different UAS don’t transfer their kinetic energy in the same way. 
For example an airship has very different impact dynamics to a metal construction fixed 
wing UAS.  
 
Many nations are dividing civilian UAS into categories by weight and whether the UA is 
flown in Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) or Beyond Visual Line of Sigh (BVLOS) (Ren, 
2017). This categorization has the benefit of being easily understandable by regular citizen, 
but capturing only some of the complexity of the different UAS types. Some nations also 
divide UAS according to their use either for aerial work or for a hobby as a model aircraft 
(Finnish Transport Safety Agency, 2015). This division tries to acknowledge the history of 
safe flying with traditional model aircraft, but making a clear definition that would separate 
traditional model aircraft from the new UAS types has proven to be difficult (EASA, 
2017). The coming EU regulation will likely change the definitions of UAS used in Fin-
land when the new legislation comes active. 
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2.3 Power sources 
Unmanned aircraft use many different types of power sources, but most of the popular 
small UAS designs are battery electric. Batteries and electric motors provide great flexibil-
ity to designers when defining what a UAS could look like. The ease of transferring power 
with electricity allows placing the batteries and motors almost anywhere in an aircraft. 
However, batteries have low power densities and can usually provide a maximum endur-
ance of around one hour. Even though batteries can only provide a short endurance multi-
ple companies have started to produce prototypes of battery electric flying taxis capable of 
flying a few hundred kilometers during that approximate one hour endurance. The eco-
nomics of this type of electric UAS taxi are forecasted to be favorable due to the efficiency 
of electric motors combined with autonomy eliminating the cost of employing a pilot. 
 
Extending the endurance of a battery electric UAS can be done by converting it to a hybrid 
electric power source. Just like in cars the hybrids can be either series where the combus-
tion engine acts simply as a generator or parallel systems where the engine drives the pro-
peller or rotors in parallel with the motor-generator (Karpiński, 2017) (Kimon P. 
Valavanis, 2015). These systems have higher energy densities, but also add complexity and 
cost to the aircraft using them. One type of a hybrid electric power source is a fuel cell 
most of which use hydrogen as a fuel, but other types of fuel can be used such as methanol. 
A good example of the difference in energy densities between batteries and fuel cells is 
Lockheed Martin’s battery powered Stalker UAS and its fuel cell powered XE variant 
(Lockheed Martin, 2017). The Stalker XE has four times longer endurance to the battery 
powered version as claimed by Lockheed Martin. 
 
Figure 2 Example of a hybrid electric power source (Karpiński, 2017) 
 
Internal combustion engines are common in many fixed-wing UAS as they provide an en-
ergy dense power source that is relatively simple and cheap. However, at the very smallest 
UAS categories internal combustion engines are not viable due to their minimum function-
al size being around a typical model aircraft single piston two stroke engine. Four stroke 
internal combustion engines have better fuel efficiency, but they also weigh more and add 
complexity and cost. Direct injection is also a technology that helps fuel efficiency and 
also reliability as the fuel mixture is easier to adjust according to altitude. In general inter-
nal combustion engines gain efficiency with size and additional aiding devices like turbos 
and fuel injection. This has made internal combustion engines more common in the larger 
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fixed-wing UAS types where the additional weight can be tolerated for the increase in fuel 
efficiency. Even in smaller UAS a two stroke internal combustion engine has far better 
energy density than a battery electric system. 
2.4 Command and Control link 
UAS can be controlled directly with a radio controller such as model aircraft have without 
any autopilot or they can have an autopilot that is commanded to fly somewhere. The 
common commercial multi-copter UAS have an autopilot and a radio controller that con-
nects directly to the unmanned aircrafts radio to provide directional commands. Usually if 
the UAS has a camera it will use a different radio link to send the video image back to the 
ground. A direct radio link requires as its name suggests a direct line of sight between the 
UAS and the controllers antenna (Gupta, 2013). This connection is usually limited by the 
signals power or the aircrafts maximum flying altitude as it has to fly higher the further it 
is from the ground antenna to counter earth’s curvature. Some command and control links 
circumvent this problem by using nodes that pass the message to the aircraft (Schalk, 
2017). These nodes can be mobile network towers, satellites or even other aircraft. The 
General Atomics MQ-1 Predator UAS use satellite communications so that a remote pilot 
can control a UAS on the other side of the globe. Using this sort of communications net-
work for control allows extending the reach of the control link, but latency can become a 
problem if the nodes are not able to pass the message instantaneously. A common problem 
with all wireless communications is the availability of frequency spectrum. Currently there 
are very few open frequencies available for commercial UAS control links (Kimon P. 
Valavanis, 2015).  
2.5 Payloads & Sensors 
UAS can have almost any type of sensors that a manned aircraft can carry (Kimon P. 
Valavanis, 2015), but the typical cheap multi-copter usually carries a video camera of 
varying quality. Some of even the cheaper end UAS can have fairly good electro optical 
cameras that are stabilized and provide 360 degree views if mounted on a gimbal. Having 
any type of thermal camera on a UAS will increase the price significantly and that price 
range is very wide starting with low resolution uncooled thermal cameras and ending at the 
large actively cooled thermal cameras. Hyper spectral imaging sensors are cameras that 
capture electromagnetic radiation from a very wide frequency bandwidth. These sensors 
can be used to detect materials and this is useful when trying to find locations for mines or 
new oil fields. LIDAR means a range sensing laser radar and these sensors function in a 
very similar way to a normal radar, but use a laser instead of radio waves. LIDAR’s have 
become a common tool in mapping and UAS are simply a cheaper platform to use for this 
sensor than manned aircraft. The cost reduction of airborne imaging with a LIDAR has 
given rise to new uses such as fast and accurate volume measuring of piles of coal or earth 
at mines and power plants. This would have been uneconomical if manned helicopters had 
to be used instead of small UAS. Some UAS have radars as sensors and these can be very 
useful in maritime surveillance or if the radar has good resolution it can be used as a good 
all weather sensor for any surface targets. The miniaturization of radars has made it possi-
ble to fit a relatively small UAS such as Insitu ScanEagle with a small synthetic aperture 
radar. 
 
 
 8 
 
2.6 Safety systems 
There are many different types of systems developed for UAS with the purpose of increas-
ing safety. Some of the simple safety systems can be found on many of the cheapest UAS. 
Geofencing means a set of predefined area coordinates inside a UAS where the aircraft will 
not fly even if the remote pilot tries to do so (Luxhoj, 2016). This system can also be only 
advisory giving a warning of flying into a protected area. The areas usually protected by 
geofencing systems are airports, but any area can be protected. Current systems are static 
where the coordinates have been uploaded to the UAS in the previous software update. In 
future concepts geofencing could be done dynamically with the UAS receiving a message 
through mobile network with coordinates of a temporary new protected area (Kopardekar, 
2016). This type of active communication between UAS on surrounding dynamic airspace 
is the foundation of Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) systems (Kopardekar, 2016) 
(SESAR Joint undertaking, 2017). 
 
Figure 3 U-Space (SESAR Joint undertaking, 2017) 
 
UTM or as its European version is called U-Space (SESAR Joint undertaking, 2017) is a 
concept of automated air traffic control managing multiple UAS using mobile network 
connections to deliver messages between UAS and the system. These UTM systems are 
intended to provide safe routing of unmanned aircraft in very low level airspace where 
most manned aircraft are forbidden to fly. UTM systems are vital if totally automated un-
manned aircraft flights are to be allowed and many new business ideas are relying on total-
ly automated UAS such as Amazon Prime Air package delivery service or all of the 
planned UAS taxis. Currently there are some limited UTM services available, but these 
systems are not yet ready to fully automate the very low level airspace management.  
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Flying above the very low level airspace in non-segregated airspace with manned aircraft 
requires UAS to be able to fly and communicate as a normal aircraft would. A difficult 
requirement of seeing and avoiding any air traffic without the help of a UTM system is 
called a Detect and Avoid (DAA) system (Molloy, 2017) (Kimon P. Valavanis, 2015). 
These systems could use many different sensing methods like electro optical sensors, radar, 
thermal cameras or active beacons from aircraft such as ADS-B. There have been tests 
trying to validate the functioning of a DAA system of some type, but no system has yet 
been approved to be capable of flying in non-segregated airspace with other aircraft.  
 
One of the simplest but most effective safety systems is a parachute. There are many para-
chutes on the market that have been designed specifically for UAS, but these have many 
different launch methods such as springs, compressed air canisters and small explosives 
(Prisacariu, 2016). Some manned aircraft also have parachutes proving that they are a very 
effective recovery system even for larger aircraft. Parachutes must be integrated into UAS 
autopilot to be able to receive the necessary signals for when to launch and to stop spinning 
of the rotors and propellers before launch. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 UAS landed with a parachute (Prisacariu, 2016) 
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3 Previous knowledge and research of UAS risks 
Empirical research papers on UAS safety and reliability have been uncommon for the past 
years, but now new studies which try to empirically quantify the risks are starting to be 
published. Most of the older empirical studies were focused on military systems as armies 
have been early adopters of unmanned aircraft technology. The data gathered for these 
earlier studies is mostly of older types of military UAS reliability (Dermentzoudis, 2004) 
(Dalamagkidis, 2008) as these systems have been widely fielded in various armies around 
the world. However, military UAS reliability data cannot be applied straight to the civilian 
world because of multiple technical differences between military and civilian UAS. Mili-
tary UAS can be much larger, fly at higher altitudes, often use much more expensive com-
ponents and also be propelled by internal combustion engines, whereas the typical civilian 
UAS rely on commercial of the shelf electric motors, lithium batteries and electronic com-
ponents. Therefore, empirical studies of military UAS reliability and extrapolation of this 
to the civilian world’s ground risk (Dalamagkidis, 2008) cannot be taken as a reliable esti-
mate of the current civilian UAS aviation. Thus a completely new set of studies is needed 
to quantify commercial UAS reliability and risks associated with operations. 
 
3.1 Theoretical studies of UAS risk 
Most of the older studies of risks related to UAS tried to find theoretical frameworks to 
estimate related risks. These theoretical studies on UAS safety and ground risk offer tools 
for estimating probabilities and risk levels, but the lack of statistical data makes these 
models only a thought experiment without confirmation. Many studies have tried to esti-
mate UAS impact severity with theoretical methods such as blunt criterion calculations 
from impact energy (Radi, 2013) (La Cour-Harbo, 2015) (Magister, 2010). These early 
theoretical studies have influenced current regulations around the world by establishing 
mass thresholds for UAS categories. Commonly accepted mass limit for “harmless” UAS 
is under 250 g which was established from blunt criterion calculations trying to match the 
resulting risk to current manned aviation (La Cour-Harbo, 2015). The current risk level for 
manned aviation is one death per 10
8
 flight hours.  
 
Another influential study calculated the impact energy limit for UAS able to penetrate a 
shelter with corrugated iron roof (Clothier, 2010). This limit results in an estimate of UAS 
weighing less than 7 kg being safe for people inside buildings. It is important to note that 
these estimates are drawn from simplistic assumptions and result in conservative estimates 
of risk. Two of these conservative assumptions were that the UAS won’t deform on impact 
and that the UAS kinetic energy is transferred completely to the target. Because of these 
assumptions a cricket ball thrown at a human is evaluated to be lethal using the same mod-
el, but the empirical evidence shows that this estimate is clearly not true and too conserva-
tive (Radi, 2013). This example shows the need to have empirical studies verifying real 
world results that offer more accurate models for estimating risk. 
 
The more reliable theoretical studies conducted are simulations of UAS behaviour in an 
accident. Computer simulations are a powerful tool in aviation industry and the models 
used for simulations are getting better with time. Netherlands Aerospace Centre made sim-
ulations of small UAS impact location distributions and found them to be approximately of 
elliptical shape and varying according to UAS speed and type (Y. Haartsen, 2016). Curi-
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ously for multi-copter UAS flying at a height of 150m or 300m the impact distribution 
covering 80% of impacts were the same from both heights. For this probability the impact 
areas were 60x60 square meters for drops from both altitudes. This is a useful estimate 
when designing an operation and the needed safety boundaries.  
 
Figure 5 Simulated UAS impact probability pattern (Y. Haartsen, 2016) 
 
Simulation from Virginia Tech modelled outcomes of UAS impacting jet engines (Song, 
2016). This study was motivated by the fact that 76% of recorded bird strikes impacted 
with passenger aircraft’s engines (Radi, 2013). Knowing what a jet engines resilience is to 
UAS impacts is very important if bird strike data is a reliable estimate of mid-air impact 
locations. The study (Song, 2016) modelled a 5.6 kg UAS being ingested by a high bypass 
ratio jet engine with the intention of finding out is UAS ingestion more dangerous than an 
equivalent sized bird ingestion. Results showed that a UAS weighing the same as a Cana-
dian goose will cause a catastrophic failure to a jet engine if ingested. This result can be 
considered to be reliable since structure modelling techniques nowadays are very accurate. 
However, the weight of the modelled UAS was much larger than the average commercial 
UAS, leaving open the question would a 1 kg or 2 kg UAS cause as much damage to a jet 
engine? Looking at the market leader DJI’s development of cheap UAS, the trend in these 
types seems to be reduction of size.  First DJI Phantom had a mass of 1.2kg, the newer 
Mavic model weighs around 800g and after Mavic DJI launched the Spark UAS which has 
a mass of 300g. 
 
Figure 6 Simulated UAS impact to a turbofan (Song, 2016) 
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3.2 Empirical knowledge of UAS risks 
The normal aviation occurrence reporting structures have produced a record of pilot reports 
of close encounters between manned and unmanned aircraft. The accuracy of this record is 
a big problem because it is formed from pilot visual sightings that in many cases are uncer-
tain whether the flying object was a bird, balloon or UAS. The record is also likely missing 
many close encounters where the pilot didn’t notice the UAS and the drone pilot didn’t 
know about the reporting culture because he or she didn’t have a pilot licence training or 
otherwise sufficient knowledge of aviation reporting. Still this record has shown that close 
encounters between manned and unmanned aircraft have been rising fast (EASA, 2016) as 
expected with fast growth of the commercial UAS industry.  
 
Australian study found a correlation between Google searches of UAS online shops and 
numbers of occurrence report numbers (ATSB, 2017). This is a valuable finding as the 
technique can be used to estimate numbers of consumer UAS operating any one country. 
Also the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has noted the trend of rising occur-
rence reports in its study (EASA, 2016), even though the report mostly identifies 
knowledge gaps and recommends funding research in these areas. The EASA report high-
lighted as one of the knowledge gaps not knowing how much damage an impact to a jet 
engine would cause. This is raised as concern due to the expected probability of 76% of all 
impacts hitting the engines (Radi, 2013), drawn from bird collision statistics.  
 
A statistical study very much like this thesis  (Graham Wild, 2017) analysed 152 oc-
currence reports of UAS accidents collected from various sources between 2006 and 2015, 
which is a small sample spanning a very long time in perspective of the fast developing 
UAS world. The time and location span of the data, combined with a small sample argua-
bly make results from this study (Graham Wild, 2017) unreliable. Study analysed the in-
formation included in the standard ICAO occurrence categories and found that 63% of the 
reported accidents were caused by technical failures while 14% were caused by loss of 
control. These values can be used for comparison to the results gained from this thesis, but 
the data used in the study is of a world that is not representative of current civilian UAS 
market, so the expectation is that these numbers will be somewhat different. Also it should 
be noted that ICAO occurrence report is designed for manned aviation and does not in-
clude some of the technical fault categories or unique occurrences which UAS experience. 
In this thesis questions were designed to include these missing categories that are unique 
for UAS operations such as lost link faults, crashes where no people were involved or dif-
ferent control methods.  
 
Most notable resent study (ASSURE, 2017) of civilian UAS risks was conducted by Alli-
ance for System Safety of UAS through Research Excellence (ASSURE) program that was 
tasked by FAA to do research needed to integrate UAS safely into airspace. ASSURE 
groups study is one of the first empirical assesment of third party ground collision risk. The 
research used common types of UAS in its tests, so it is a very good benchmark to estimate 
risk from. The report included a large literature research of different casualty models and 
injury models and compared them. The study identified three injury types that represented 
the most significant threats to humans from UAS collisions, these types were lacerations, 
blunt force trauma and penetration injuries.  
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The ground breaking part of the research was a set of 24 collision tests of UAS against a 
50
th
 percentile male crash test dummy to find out how much energy is transferred during an 
impact. The results of these initial tests estimated the transfer being 44-67% of the UA’s 
kinetic energy. Dummy was set up in a seated position for the test impacts which were 
targeted to the head from angles of 90°, 65° and 0°. The UA used was DJI Phantom 3 and 
the speeds tested varied from 5 to 15 m/s. Resulting evaluation of impact severity from a 
1.2 kg UA at these velocities was a 12,5% probability of an Abbreviated Injury Scale 
(AIS) level 3 injury or greater (ASSURE, 2017). The most likely injury type predicted was 
a neck injury and skull fractures were estimated to have only a 1.5% probability. These 
tests are a good first basis for evaluating the potential severity of a common UAS impact-
ing with a human. However, the speed range of these tests does not go high enough to cov-
er a hit from a drone travelling at a typical maximum speed or a drop from maximum al-
lowed height. These tests provided extremely valuable new information, but there are still 
many unknown scenarios that need to be tested in the future. 
 
Figure 7 UAS collision test (ASSURE, 2017) 
 
One of the key findings in the study (ASSURE, 2017) is that in a collision with a human 
the UAS transfers approximately 44-67% of it’s kinetic energy into the target. This is a 
very important result when compared to the earlier theoretical studies that used 
assumptions of perfect kinetic energy transfer to target. Re-evaluating the mass thressholds 
established in the earlier theoretical studies (La Cour-Harbo, 2015) (Clothier, 2010) would 
result in higher estimates of safe mass. It should be remembered that mass is not the only 
factor that affects impact severity and thus it is a conservative decision to use a smaller 
safe mass threshold. Arrow and a tennis ball that weigh the same have very different 
impact dynamics and this problem means that more tests with varying types and sizes of 
UAS should be conducted to draw more generalizable conclusions.   
 
Final assessment from the reports full content is that UA kinetic energy, energy density 
and rotor diameter are the most critical measures that affect the severity of a collision. Ki-
netic energy seems to be the most determining factor so long as the UA doesn’t have a 
large single rotor with rotational energy reaching lethal levels. Even smaller rotors can 
cause laceration injuries and thus rotor guards are recommended.  ASSURE programs 
UAS Ground Collision Severity Evaluation Final Report is a very thorough vanguard study 
into the actual effects of a ground collision between humans and UAS. 
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Probably the latest crash test study of small UAS was conducted by Virginia Tech 
(Campolettano, 2017). This study had a less controlled test set up than the ASSURE report. 
Researcher used a 50
th
 percentile male test dummy that was seated in a garden chair in the 
middle of a large indoor space and then three different types of commercially available 
UAS were flown at the dummy or dropped on to it. This set up couldn’t produce exactly 
similar impacts repeatedly but instead a distribution of fairly similar ones. The flight im-
pacts were set up so that the UAS started accelerating from 40m away from the dummy to 
reach top speed and then was steered to impact the dummy’s head. With this set up multi-
ple attempts to hit the dummy’s head failed and no flight impacts of the 3,1kg mass drone 
were successful. Drop impacts were set up so that the UAS was dropped from a platform 
with height of 5.5m directly above the dummy so the final impact velocity was 10m/s. The 
three different types of UAS used for the tests had masses of 1.2kg (DJI Phantom 3), 3.1kg 
(DJI Inspire 1) and 11kg (DJI S1000+). 
 
Figure 8 Virginia Tech UAS collision tests (Campolettano, 2017) 
 
Results from this study estimated head injuries of level AIS 3 severity for the 1.2 kg and 
3.1 kg UAS to have probabilities close to 0%, while the 11kg UAS had a probability of 
around 40% for similar injury (Campolettano, 2017). As estimated in the ASSURE report 
(ASSURE, 2017) neck injuries were predicted to be more likely than head injuries.  The 
1.2 kg UAS was estimated to have probabilities of 3.9% up to 11.6% for causing a neck 
injury of AIS 3 severity from an impact. The 3.1kg UAS had probabilities ranging around 
10% to 20% for similar neck injuries and the 11 kg UAS had probabilities ranging from 
around 20% to 70%. The wide range of injury probabilities for the same type of UAS 
shows that the test set up was not very controlled, but also shows that in real life small 
changes in the impact location or UAS orientation can cause big differences in injuries. It 
is noticeable that the largest UAS model had very high injury probabilities even when 
dropped from a height of just 5.5m. This would suggest that filming over a crowd of peo-
ple with such a heavy UAS is very dangerous if the impact risk is not mitigated in any 
way. 
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4 Questionnaire 
The survey of unmanned aviation in Finland during year 2016 was done with a voluntary 
anonymous online questionnaire. This period was chosen because it would give the first 
full years’ worth of data and possible further yearly surveys could be compared to this 
study.  Method of an online survey was chosen because of the large sample size and ease 
of data analysis from a digital system. Participants were guaranteed anonymity in hope that 
this would yield honest answers even of negative events. These negative events such as 
crashes or near miss incidents are the main interest from a risk management viewpoint and 
knowing the main risks is essential for defining the appropriate level of regulation for UAS 
operations. Manned aviation has an established occurrence reporting system, which is used 
to gather similar information, but since UAS pilots have no training requirements this sys-
tem is unknown to most operators. The normal occurrence reporting system is not generat-
ing enough reports from unmanned aviation activities and thus this survey provides much 
needed clarity into the current situation. The existing system is also partially unsuitable to 
unmanned aviation as occurrences such as lost link or loss of visual contact are absent 
from the reporting form. Questionnaire was formulated so that it would cover common 
occurrences to unmanned aviation as best as possible and also survey basic statistics of 
operations.  
 
The population for the survey was all unmanned operators that had made a notification to 
Finnish civil aviation authority’s online register before 31.12.2016. There were no hobby-
ists included in the sample due to the impossibility of contacting them efficiently. Out of 
the 1059 email addresses gathered from the unmanned operator register, 28 emails were 
found not functional anymore after the questionnaire was sent. The total response rate to 
the survey was 22% of the population (N) of 1031 functional registry members. Out of 
these 227 respondents 15 had no activity during 2016 and were counted out from the scope 
of the survey and also 3 participants were disqualified due to erroneous answers. This 
gives the sample (n) of 209 participants a confidence interval of 6% at a 95% confidence 
level. 
Margin of error for a finite population at 95% confidence level 
0,98
√𝑛
∗ √
𝑁−𝑛
𝑁−1
= ±6%   (1) 
 
4.1 Goal of questionnaire 
Goal of the questionnaire was to gather previously unknown data of unmanned aviation in 
Finland. The data should be of sufficient quality and type to be able to calculate statistical 
probabilities of different risk factors and be able to compare these factors to each other. 
Expected levels of occurrences and reliability statistics of UAS are of particular value to 
the aviation authority when trying to determine an acceptable level of risk mitigation 
measures for operations near people or important infrastructure. Another problem when 
trying to determine risk to people on the ground is understanding population density in 
accurate and dynamic manner. A particular road for example can be very crowded during 
morning and evening traffic hours, but almost completely empty during night. Population 
density was surveyed in a vague manner due to limitations set by the survey format and 
thus only parts of the equation of ground risk can be estimated from this survey.  
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Through this study Finnish Transport Safety Agency should gain a window into the reali-
ties and risks of unmanned aviation. Ideally the information gathered can be used to focus 
efforts into most pressing problems and to proportionately scale the regulatory demands 
and other actions to the risks. For the operators themselves the information on aircraft reli-
ability can be useful in trying to determine what types of operations are economically fea-
sible or safe enough for third parties. If this survey will remain as a single study it will 
have offered a quick glimpse into the commercial unmanned aviation operations around 
Finland, but the greatest use from these statistics would be figuring out trends in the nation 
if the survey is used to perform a continuous longitudinal study. 
 
4.2 Design of research questions 
The survey was designed to gather statistics of unmanned operations in a form that can be 
analysed to find the most influential variables to risk. Also general statistics of UAS opera-
tions can be used to estimate the total flight numbers and their distribution around Finland. 
Common risk statistics in manned aviation are accidents or deaths per flight hour and also 
the total number of flight hours. Similar basic safety statistics gathered form UAS opera-
tors activity can be used to scale authority resources accordingly to the level of UAS risks 
and levels of activity. The intent of the overall questionnaire is to provide enough data to 
narrow down the uncertainty in estimates of risk to the general public. This estimate can 
then be used when assessing whether the current regulation is adequate, too prohibitive or 
not stringent enough.  
 
The questionnaire was produced using Webropol company’s online survey systems third 
edition. Unfortunately the system was still partially under development while the question-
naire was designed and lacked some useful features that would have made the questions 
easier to answer for the respondents. Some participants gave feedback to improve the ques-
tionnaire and hopefully if this survey is to become longitudinal the corrections will be pos-
sible in the Webropol system. Finished questionnaire had 32 questions about UAS activity 
and it was translated into Finnish and English. One difficulty in designing this survey was 
the attempt to keep it short so that the response rate would be high enough to provide relia-
ble results, but not too short that the questions provide no real value due to being too 
vague. Some of the questions were too detailed and other could have had some more de-
tails, but the overall resulting balance was quite good. The questions are listed on the next 
page in English and the full questionnaire with all the answering options and visualisations 
can be found in Appendix 2. Introductory letter that was sent with the questionnaire can be 
found in Appendix 1.  
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Research questions: 
 
1. Did you have any flights with unmanned aircraft during 2016? 
2. What types of unmanned aircraft you operated during 2016? 
3. Estimate how many flights you performed in Finland during 2016? 
4. Estimate how many minutes one flight lasted on average? 
5. Estimate the division of all flights during 2016 by province in percentages. 
6. Estimate the percentages of all flights during 2016 according to operation type. 
7. Estimate how many flights you did over a crowd of people during 2016. 
8. How did you ensure the safety of these flights in the case of an aircraft falling to 
the ground? 
9. Estimate how many flights you did over densely populated areas during 2016. 
10. Estimate how many flights you did beyond visual line of sight during 2016. 
11. Did you have a need to fly closer than 5km from an airport or fly higher than 50m 
inside the airport control zone during 2016? 
12. How many times did you contact air traffic control to ask a permission to deviate 
from normal rules inside an airport control zone? 
13. During 2016 were you involves in any occurrences, incidents or accidents? 
14. Estimate the numbers of occurrences, incidents and accidents you were involved in 
during 2016. 
15. Estimate the division of occurrences, incidents and accidents according to visibility 
conditions during flight. 
16. Estimate the division of occurrences, incidents and accidents according to flight ar-
ea. 
17. Estimate the division of occurrences, incidents and accidents according to control 
method. 
18. Did you make occurrence reports from the events? 
19. Did you know about the requirement for making occurrence reports? 
20. Do you feel that making the report is too difficult? 
21. Have you taken insurance against third party damages according to EU-
requirements? 
22. Did your aircraft experience any technical faults during 2016? 
23. Estimate the numbers of faults to the most suitable categories. 
24. What types of unmanned aircraft were the faults in? 
25. Did any of your aircraft fall down during 2016? 
26. How many times your aircraft fell during 2016? 
27. Estimate how many of the falls were controlled? 
28. Estimate what reasons led to the aircraft falling. 
29. Do you think Finnish aviation regulation on use of remotely piloted aircraft and 
model aircraft is easy to understand? 
30. What makes you feel this way? 
31. How do you see the future of unmanned aviation from your perspective? 
32. What makes you feel this way about the future? 
 
 
 
 18 
 
4.3 Sample 
Questionnaire was sent to 1059 unmanned aircraft operators that had registered to Trafi 
between 2015 and 31.12.2016. 42 of the operators were from outside of Finland and the 
rest were Finnish. Foreigners were given an English version of the introductory email and 
the rest received a Finnish language version, but all had the option to choose in which lan-
guage they wanted to see the questionnaire. The survey was closed on 31.8.2017 and gath-
ered 227 answers out of which 209 held valid information of operations during 2016. 227 
answers to the survey were submitted out of which 15 answered to the first question that 
they did not have any flight activity during 2016. On top of this, 3 participants made so 
erroneous and illogical answers that they were removed from the analysis altogether. The 
209 answers that held valid information of activity during 2016 constitute around 92% of 
the total responses. The sample is not representative of the entire unmanned aircraft sector 
as the survey is missing all recreational UAS pilots. Therefore, the sample should be 
viewed as a small but active portion of the unmanned operators. Out of the 1031 operators 
with functional registry information we estimated 92% were active during 2016. With 
these numbers the total estimated number of flying UAS operators during 2016 was 949. 
 
Survey’s sample of 209 active operators with flight activity during 2016 is not representa-
tive of the entire UAS community because it excludes all hobbyists. Hobbyists are pre-
sumed to be a much larger group and therefore the results of this study can only be used as 
a meaningful estimation of the professional unmanned operators. However, the reliability 
data of UAS can be used as a good estimation of hobbyist drones since professionals often 
use the most popular drone models on the market that are also available for hobbyists. In 
future if UAS activity will be surveyed there should be effort put into including hobbyist in 
the sample. 
4.4 Data corrections 
Estimating submitted data’s integrity was a huge dilemma during this study. What to do 
with incomplete, erroneous or just suspicious answers? To resolve this problem a choice 
had to be made whether to abandon such answers altogether or try to edit the more obvi-
ously false data points. The selected choice was a middle ground of removing the com-
pletely false answerers and editing the remaining few typing errors with a conservative 
touch. Three participant’s answers were removed completely due to the fact that their an-
swers were contradicting themselves from one question to the next. The remaining errone-
ous data points were one skipped flight distribution estimate, one impossible answer to 
average flight time estimate, two extreme outlier values in flight numbers and in crash es-
timates plus 9 suspicious values in Question 23. The two extreme outlier values seemed 
like typing errors with extra zeros in the number, so they were corrected by removing the 
assumed extra zeros from the numbers. The unbelievable flight time estimate and the miss-
ing answer were simply ignored in the analysis as this would have the smallest effect on 
the overall estimates. The large number of suspicious or erroneous answers to question 23 
is explainable by bad wording of the question. After several percentages scale questions 
faults were asked to be estimated in numbers of instances. All these answers totalled 100 as 
requested in the few previous questions. Correcting this error was big dilemma as it would 
affect the average estimate of UAS faults. A choice was made to edit the answers to be the 
minimum numbers of faults that would keep the answers to the following questions still 
logical. This does mean that there is a larger error probability in the analysis of numbers of 
faults to the direction of fewer faults. This was due to the fact that there was certain 
knowledge that the answerers had experienced faults but it was impossible to know as to 
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how many. The only certain knowledge from the erroneous answers was the types of faults 
experienced. 
5 Results 
The major goal of this questionnaire is to find out the average levels of safety associated 
with UAS flights in Finland. The survey questions were designed so that the basic metrics 
of aviation safety could be formulated for UAS operations. The basic metrics are numbers 
of occurrences, crashes and technical faults against total flight hours or numbers of flights. 
Estimating UAS risks has some unique elements and metrics due to the fact that crashes 
and accidents won’t necessarily cause any injuries or casualties. If UAS flights are con-
ducted in areas where there is low risk of collision with third parties the activity can be 
totally safe even though the UA would crash very often. However, the safety aspects of 
this survey can only be generalized to professional UAS operators because of the sampled 
population, but technical fault propensity can be expected to be approximately equal to all 
UAS and model aircraft in Finland. The survey also aimed at providing an overall picture 
of the activities that professional UAS operators conducted in Finland during 2016. The 
general statistics of activity around Finland can be used for focusing resources to the most 
active regions.  
5.1 Basic statistics of UAS aviation in Finland 
5.1.1 Numbers of UAS operated in Finland 
The UAS operators who had activity during 2016 and answered the survey operated in 
total 452 unmanned aircraft. The most aircraft for a single operator was 35 while the aver-
age was 2.16 UA for every operator. However, looking closer at the numbers of UAS the 
median shows that the typical operator only has one UAS in use. The aircraft were divided 
into different types according to Table 1. Helicopter/Multicopter type UA were the most 
common type representing 85.18% of all UA. The proportion of helicopter/multicopter UA 
from all UA is likely even higher for hobbyists, but this cannot be verified from this study. 
These numbers were already somewhat known from the registry data, but a verification of 
the statistics will improve the registers reliability as a source of up to date information. 
 
 
Table 1 Aircraft operated 
Helicopter / 
Multicopter Aeroplane 
Helicopter-Aeroplane  
Hybrid Airship Other 
385 45 9 0 13 
85.18% 9.96% 1.99% 0.00% 2.88% 
 
5.1.2 UA flights in Finland during 2016 
Operators answered that they flew in total 15569 flights during 2016 with the most flights 
for a single operator being 1000 in a year, while median was 30 flights per year and the 
average for all operators was 74.49 flights. The results of numbers of UAS operated and 
flight numbers show that there are many small operators that are not very active and a few 
that are operating on a much larger scale. The estimate for a single flights time was on av-
erage 15.1 minutes for all operators with the longest average flight time an operator report-
ed being 90 minutes. This estimate of average flight time is believable and expected as the 
maximum operating time of common types of multicopters are around 20 to 30 minutes.  
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Calculated from numbers of flights and the estimates of average flight time the annual total 
flight hours for these 209 active operators is 3559.17 hours. The first questions answers 
give a number of 92% operators are active in the register. Using this percentage the esti-
mated total number of active operators in Finland during 2016 is 949. Out of the total 
number of active operators during 2016, we can approximate the total flight hours for all 
operators would be 16161 flight hours. This is still a small number when compared to the 
300000 flight hours (Finnish Transport Safety Agency, 2017) that manned aviation per-
formed in Finland during 2016. It should be remembered that the UAS flight hours is only 
a valid estimate of the professional UAS operators excluding all hobbyists. The number of 
commercial UAS operators has been increasing fast in Finland ever since the register was 
opened. It will be interesting to see to what direction unmanned aviation operations will 
develop. Perhaps BVLOS operations will become more common place or maybe photo-
graphing will become even more dominating with ever cheaper models of UAS entering 
the market. 
 
 
Table 2 UAS flights in Finland 
Total number of flights surveyed (n) 15569 
Average time of flight (min) 15.10 
Total number of flight hours surveyed (h) 3559.17 
Estimated total flight hours for all registered 
operators during 2016 (h) 
16161 
 
5.1.3 Distribution of flights around Finland 
The participants were asked where their flights took place in Finland in percentages by 
county and from the answers a distribution of the total flight hours around the nation could 
be calculated. The results are shown in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 9 with color-coded 
counties where darker colour means more flights. Comparing the distribution of flight 
hours with the population distribution of Finland from February 2017 (Statistics Finland, 
2017) we can see a very close relation. Only significant outlier counties are Lappi with 
higher than expected flight hours and Pohjois-Savo with lower than expected flight hours. 
This close relation of population distribution and flight hours is intriguing and useful in-
formation for aviation authorities. It will be interesting to see if the distributions of flight 
hours and population will start to diverge more in the future, but for now population distri-
bution can be used as a fairly accurate estimation of where UAS flights are taking place. 
Even though there is no data of hobbyist included in this survey, the fact that even the 
commercial operators follow closely the population structure would suggest that this is true 
also of hobbyists.  
 
 
 
  
 21 
 
 
 
Table 3 UAS flight hours by county 
County Flight hours 
Percentage of 
all flight hours 
County’s percentage of 
Finland’s population 
1 Uusimaa 1012.5 28.57 29.81 
2 Pirkanmaa 390.6 11.02 9.26 
3 Lappi 282.2 7.96 3.27 
4 Varsinais-Suomi 252.6 7.13 8.64 
5 Pohjois-Pohjanmaa 229.7 6.48 7.47 
6 Keski-Suomi 213.3 6.02 5.01 
7 Etelä-Pohjanmaa 171.83 4.85 3.48 
8 Kanta-Häme 162.1 4.57 3.15 
9 Päijät-Häme 160.87 4.54 3.66 
10 Satakunta 150.1 4.23 4.02 
11 Pohjanmaa 135.6 3.83 3.30 
12 Etelä-Savo 96.2 2.71 2.70 
13 Pohjois-Karjala 71.3 2.01 2.98 
14 Pohjois-Savo 64.7 1.83 4.50 
15 Kymenlaakso 56.7 1.6 3.22 
16 Etelä-Karjala 42.66 1.2 2.37 
17 Kainuu 21.9 0.62 1.36 
18 Keski-Pohjanmaa 15.5 0.44 1.26 
19 Ahvenanmaa 13.68 0.39 0.53 
1 
2 
4 
6 
5 
3 
7 
9 
8 
10 
18 
19 
11 
12 
13 
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15 
16 
17 
Figure 9 Distribution of UAS flights in Finland 
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5.1.4 Types of aerial work done in Finland during 2016 
Participants were asked what different types of aerial work their operations were in per-
centages of all flights. Using this distribution the most common types of aerial work done 
with UAS was calculated. The distribution is shown in Table 4. Photographing and vide-
otaping makes up 69.75% of all aerial work activity in Finland with the next most common 
aerial work being mapping or charting at 8.37%. This shows that the commercial UAS 
industry is very much driven by a single aerial work type. However, it is likely that if aerial 
work types were compared in euros earned during 2016 Photographing and videotaping 
would not be the major market. Most exemption permits for more complex operations are 
granted for LIDAR measuring, charting or infrastructure inspections. One clear current 
trend is increased use of UAS for inspections of the electrical grid. This is evident from the 
numbers of airspace reservations for BVLOS use of UAS. 
 
Table 4 UAS aerial work flight hours 
Type of Aerial Work Flight hours 
Pecentage of all 
Flight hours 
Photographing, videotaping 2482.47 69.75 
Mapping or charting 297.79 8.37 
Test flights for development of new de-
vices or functions 
139.31 3.91 
Press, media 135.04 3.79 
Search and rescue services 77.17 2.17 
RPAS flight training 49.68 1.40 
Agricultural work 41.75 1.17 
Forestry work 39.99 1.12 
Inspection of buildings or roofs 39.09 1.10 
Scientific research 37.65 1.06 
Measurement of mobile phone networks 
or other telecommunication networks 
34.07 0.96 
Providing an overall situation picture for 
an entity in command of other operations 
29.80 0.84 
Logistics 25.21 0.71 
Surveillance 20.70 0.58 
Tasks using a thermographic camera 15.41 0.43 
Inspection of masts or wind power plants 7.48 0.21 
Inspection of other constructions, e.g. 
bridges 
5.18 0.15 
LIDAR or other sensor 3.33 0.09 
Powerline inspection 3.17 0.09 
Gas pipe inspection 0.06 0.00 
Aircraft external inspections 0.06 0.00 
Ship emission measurements 0.00 0.00 
Measurement of radiation or other emis-
sions 
0.00 0.00 
Ore prospecting or other soil survey 0.00 0.00 
Other 74.75 2.10 
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5.1.5 Flights above crowds of people, densely populated areas and 
beyond visual line of sight 
Operators were asked how many flights they conducted above crowds of people, Beyond 
Visual Line of Sight and above densely populated areas. The results are listed in Table 5. 
Flights above densely populated areas were almost exactly one third of all flights during 
2016. This is not a very surprising fact when taking into account that flight numbers close-
ly follow population density across Finland, if anything the percentage could be expected 
to be even higher. Flights above crowds of people and densely populated areas are subjec-
tive measures since there is no clear definition of a crowd and densely populated areas are 
similarly difficult to measure objectively during an operation. This lack of clarity shows its 
effects on the free text answer to the question “How did you ensure the safety of these 
flights in the case of an aircraft falling to the ground?” Large numbers of operators an-
swered that they conducted operations above crowds of people, but then added that they 
actually flew close to a crowd and never directly on top of one.  
 
The only objective measure in Table 5 is numbers of BVLOS flights which make up 7.9% 
of all flights. This is a large number when considering that these flights require reserving a 
temporary danger area for the operations, but in one operation there can be multiple flights. 
It will be interesting to see what types of operators will grow in numbers as the market 
evolves. BVLOS flights would seem to have the greatest economic potential and thus 
could grow faster in future, but if multicopters keep getting less expensive even more pho-
tographers could purchase one.  
 
 
Table 5 Special UAS flight statistics 
 Above crowds 
of people 
Above densely popu-
lated areas 
BVLOS flights 
Flights 191 5096 1225 
Percentage out 
of all flights 
1.2% 32.7% 7.9% 
 
 
 
Operators who had flown above crowds of people during 2016 were asked to clarify how 
they had ensured the safety of uninvolved persons during these flights. The free text an-
swers to this question were categorised, grouped and shown in proportion of their frequen-
cy in Figure 10. Some of the operators had used multiple methods of risk reduction while a 
small portion answered that they had done nothing, but trusted the reliability of their UAS. 
Only 6% of operators flying above crowds had installed a parachute in their UAS. Howev-
er, this is understandable as 41% answered that they did not even fly directly above a 
crowd which technically means these operators did not in fact fly above crowds. Removing 
this 41% from the sample and calculating again with the operators actually flying above 
crowds 10% use a parachute in their UAS. 
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Figure 10 Methods of ensuring safety while flying above a crowd of people 
 
 
5.1.6 Flights close to airports 
A frequently highlighted risk from UAS operations is a collision between passenger air-
craft and UA. The risk of a mid-air collision is greatest around airports where passenger 
aircraft are flying low enough to encounter UA. However this also means that the passen-
ger aircraft are travelling at slower speeds. The current Finnish regulation on unmanned 
aircraft prohibits flying closer than 5km of an airport runway with a UA or higher than 
50m when outside the 5km border but below the airport control zone. These rules are illus-
trated in Figure 11. No UAS operator has ever been caught violating this rule, but multiple 
hobbyists have. Arguably no close encounter situation between a UA and a passenger jet 
has happened so that the UA was flown according to these rules. The conclusion from this 
is that lack of regulation is not the real problem, but rather general knowledge of the rules 
amongst hobbyists or people are ignoring the rules.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flights not directly 
above crowd 
41% 
Light weight UAS 
4% Training 
2% 
Emergency landing 
zones prepared 
13% 
Parachute 
6% 
Careful preflight 
checks 
6% 
Trust in the 
reliability of the 
UAS 
4% 
Time flying above 
the crowd was 
minimised 
9% 
Pilot was directly 
under the UAS  
2% 
Instructions to the 
crowd 
13% 
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Questionnaire asked if operators needed to fly closer than the allowed distance from air-
ports or higher under the airport control zone. To estimate the work load this need poses to 
air traffic controllers the next question asked how many requests operators had made to 
ATC to deviate from these rules. The results are shown in Tables 6 and 7. Little over one 
quarter of operators answered that they needed to deviate from airspace rules around air-
ports. This is expectable as many airports are close to population centres and the 5km pro-
tective zones cover large areas of cities, but still many operators need to fly in these areas. 
If estimating from all of the active UAS operators 259 needed to deviate from airport air-
space rules during 2016, but only an estimated 204 operators asked for deviation permits 
from the ATC. 
 
 
Table 6 Did you need to deviate from airport airspace rules? 
Answer n 
Percentage 
of all 
Yes 57 27.3 
No 148 70.8 
Don’t know 4 1.9 
 
 
  
The number of operators requesting deviation from airport airspace rules was less than the 
number of operators needing to deviate from the rules. This leaves two possible options, 
either some of the operators simply did not do those operations needing a permit or some 
operators simply did those operations without the permit from ATC. Either way this fact 
means that the process for asking a permit should be made easier and probably some op-
erators feel that the risk is not correctly analysed and the protective airspace areas have 
been made too large. The 45 operators who made requests to ATC asked for a permit to 
deviate 502 times. Estimating this to all of the active operators the total estimated number 
of requests to ATC is over 2200 during 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Airspace rules for UAS around airports 
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Permits are requested either by email or phone call depending on which airport is in ques-
tion. This survey cannot specify to which airports the requests were made, but logically the 
distribution should be close to the distribution of flight hours. However some airports are 
located closer to the city centre than others and airports of Utti and Jyväskylä have ex-
tremely large protective airspace areas that can raise the number of requests locally. 
 
Table 7 Request for exemption from airports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Number of incidents, accidents and occurrences  
Respondents to the survey were asked if they had accidents, incidents or occurrences that 
they were involved in during 2016. There were 60 respondents who answered yes which is 
28.7% of the entire sample. This is the percentage of operators that experienced either ac-
cidents, incidents, occurrences or some combination of these. The participants were asked 
to specify what types of accidents, incidents or occurrences had they been involved in and 
how many times. Total number of events was 459 for the 60 operators. Measuring the ma-
jor three categories accidents constituted 8%, incidents made up 7% and occurrences 85% 
of all events. Only in one of the accidents reported in this survey a person was injured, but 
to what extent was not asked in the survey. Extrapolating from these numbers for all of the 
949 active operators’ an estimate of 160 accidents, 140 incidents and1700 occurrences can 
be given for the year 2016. Estimating total numbers of accidents leading to people being 
hurt is not meaningful from this small of a sample. 
 
 
Table 8 Total numbers of accidents, incidents and occurrences with UAS 
Accidents Incidents Occurrences Total 
37 32 390 459 
8.0% 7.0% 85.0%  
 
 
Question 14 asked the operators to place the events in predefined categories of which some 
were estimated before the survey to be most likely types of events. As expected before the 
survey, control link losses were the dominating type making up 73.4% of all occurrences. 
The fact that only 28.7% of the operators answered experiencing lost link occurrences is 
not believable and probably this is attributable to most operators not considering this con-
dition as an “occurrence” in the traditional aviation meaning. This is speculation, but ex-
amining the fact that the 60 operators who answered experiencing lost link occurrences had 
337 events in total between them, leads to suspect the fact that the other 889 operators 
would have had no lost link occurrences. The other presumed category of occurrence was 
technical faults which made up 9.2% of all occurrences, this percentage conflicts with an-
swers to a later question regarding technical faults. A reasonable explanation to this con-
flict is that some operators do not consider technical faults as occurrences in the traditional 
aviation meaning. All the results are listed in Tables 8 and 9.  
 
Number of operators requesting 
45 
Requests to deviate 502 
Percentage of all operators 21.5% 
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Table 9 Numbers of different accidents, incidents and occurrences 
Type of occurrence n Percentage of all 
Loss of control link (Occurrence) 337 73.4 
Technical fault (Occurrence) 42 9.2 
Incident 32 7.0 
Other occurrence 11 2.4 
Accident no person injured 36 7.8 
Other accident 1 0.2 
 
 
 
Questions about the type of flights during which occurrences happened reveal that the ma-
jority of the flights were within visual line of sight while only 4.5% were BVLOS flights. 
This is a close relation to the numbers of flights that the surveyed operators had done in 
VLOS and BVLOS, making both types of operations seemingly as likely to experience 
occurrences as show by Table 10. These answers would give VLOS flights approximately 
a 3% chance for an occurrence per flight while estimate for BVLOS flights is 1.7% of 
flights experiencing an occurrence.  
 
 
Table 10 Occurrences in VLOS and BVLOS 
Occurrences 
in VLOS 
Occurrences 
in BVLOS 
Total flights 
in VLOS 
Total flights 
in BVLOS 
438.5 20.5 14344 1225 
95.5% 4.5% 92.1% 7.9% 
 
 
Question 16 asked if the events happen in densely populated areas and only 13.3% of the 
occurrences happened while flying in densely populated areas as shown by Table 11. This 
is a significant difference from the percentage of flights conducted in densely populated 
areas. A possible explanation for this difference could be that operators are willing to take 
more risks in rural areas than in densely populated areas, but the true reasons behind this 
difference cannot be deducted from the questionnaire results.  
 
Table 11 Occurrences in densely populated and rural areas 
Occurrences in densely 
populated areas 
Occurrences in 
rural areas 
Total flights in densely 
populated areas 
Total flights in 
rural areas 
60.9 398.1 5096 10473 
13.3% 86.7% 32.7% 67.3% 
 
 
Question 17 asked how the UA was controlled during the occurrences and the results are 
shown in Table 12. Direct control flights have a slightly smaller representation in the re-
sults than VLOS flights have in the total number of occurrences. This can be explained by 
a small number of waypoint controlled flights taking place in VLOS.  
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Table 12 Occurrences by different control methods 
Occurrences in 
direct pilot control 
Occurrences during 
pre-planned waypoint routing 
Occurrences during 
dynamic waypoint routing 
401.42 44.19 13.39 
87.5% 9.6% 2.9% 
 
Out of the 60 operators that had occurrences only 6 told that they had made a report of the 
events. This means that only 10% of the events were notified to the Civil Aviation Authori-
ty in Finland. When asked did these operators with occurrences, but who didn’t report 
them know about the requirement, 33.3% answered yes. Out of all 209 participants 65.1% 
knew about the legal requirement of making an occurrence report. These numbers tell that 
making a report is seen as either not necessary or not worth making by the 65.1% of opera-
tors that know of the requirement.  
 
 
 
Table 13 Did you report your occurrences? 
 Yes No 
n 6 54 
Percent of all occurrences 10% 90% 
 
 
 
Table 14 Did you know about the requirement of reporting occurrences? 
 Yes No 
n 136 73 
Percent of all operators 65.07% 34.93% 
 
 
A large portion of operators didn’t know of the reporting system or the requirement to use 
it in case of an occurrence. This is a clear indication that most operators have not read the 
regulation with enough care. There is no requirement for any kind of UAS pilot training in 
Finland and this is one area where that fact shows itself.  
 
 
Table 15 Operators who didn’t report events knowledge of occurrence reporting 
 Yes No 
n 18 36 
Percent of operators who 
didn’t report their occurrences 33.33% 66.67% 
 
 
 
From the beginning of this survey when forming the questionnaire there was a suspicion 
that the occurrence reporting system is poorly suited to UAS operators, their level of train-
ing and types of occurrences that UA encounter. The operators were asked if the occur-
rence reporting was difficult for them and their answers are shown in Table 16. We can see 
that 39.7% of the operators had no idea of whether the reporting system is easy to use and 
approximately one third of the operators who had an opinion thought the system is too dif-
ficult.  
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Table 16 Do you feel that making the report is too difficult? 
 Yes No I don’t know 
n 44 82 83 
Percent of all operators 21.1% 39.2% 39.7% 
 
 
Analysing the operators that encountered occurrences during 2016 separately gives us a 
different view than the average of all operators. The 6 operators who reported their occur-
rences are split 50-50 by their conclusion of the reporting being difficult. However, this is 
a very small sample and should not be considered to be representative in any way. On the 
other side the operators with occurrences, but who didn’t report answered according to the 
results in Table 17. This also shows the near 50-50 split between operators who had an 
opinion on the matter.  
 
Table 17 Operators who didn’t report events: Do you feel that making the report is too difficult?  
Yes No I don’t know 
15 13 26 
27.8% 24.1% 48.1% 
 
A problem that had been identified before making the survey was that not all operators had 
taken the required insurance against third party damages. Finding out the proportion of 
operators that have taken the legally required insurance is interesting from the aviation 
authority’s point of view. Out of the 209 operators surveyed 133 had taken the insurance, 
while 76 admitted that they had not. This result was expected when taking into account the 
relative novelty of Finnish unmanned aircraft regulation and difficulties in acquiring these 
insurances. For a given period no Finnish insurance company was offering this type of 
insurance and this was causing problems for the operators. Today there is more offering 
from the insurance industry and Finnish companies have also started insuring UAS opera-
tions. 
 
Table 18 Have you taken insurance for your operations? 
Yes No 
133 76 
63.6% 36.4% 
 
 
 
5.3 Technical faults in UAS 
One interesting question that has not been answered is what is the likelihood for a UAS to 
experience a technical fault?  This question has been asked from the major manufacturers 
of small civilian UA by aviation authorities, but no answer’s been given. There are occa-
sional reports from UAS pilots where technical faults are reported, but these are not fre-
quent enough to give a complete picture. In the questionnaire the participants were asked 
“Did your UAS experience any technical faults during 2016?”  to which 56 operators an-
swered yes. The results of this question are shown in Table 19. To further clarify this mat-
ter the respondents who had experienced technical faults were asked what types of faults 
and how many faults they had experienced. Nine operator’s answers to this question were 
 30 
 
erroneous and edited. Therefore the total number of faults could be larger than the numbers 
represented here. The large number of erroneous answers was likely due to the rhythm of 
the questionnaire with multiple percentage answers before asking again numbers of inci-
dent. 
 
 
The 56 operators who had experienced technical faults in their UAS reported in total 187 
separate faults. The number of faults has a larger error due to the fact that 9 operators an-
swers had to be modified and the answers were modified to a minimum number of faults 
experienced that still retained internal logic with the following questions. This means that 
the numbers of faults likely have some error to the more reliable direction. On average 
UAS experience one fault during every 83.3 flights, but taking a closer look at the types of 
technical faults in Table 20, we can see that this statistic is greatly affected by radio link 
failures. Radio link failures can be caused by external disturbances and vary between dif-
ferent locations and thus the failure rate is not necessarily an intrinsic property of a given 
UAS. 
 
 
Table 19 Did your aircraft experience any technical faults during 2016? 
 Yes No I don’t know 
n 56 153 0 
% 26.8 73.2 0 
 
 
Of all technical problems radio link related faults make up 50.8%. A radio link failure 
would not result in a crash if the UA is equipped with return to home function, unless the 
UAS happens to hit something on its way back. Return to home function will fly the UAS 
back to its starting position in the event of loss of control link and this function is a com-
mon feature in many UAS. One typical pilot mistake is forgetting to set the home location 
before a flight and this can result in the UAS flying away from the pilot. Radio link prob-
lems can be expected to occur around once per 164 flights. The presumption before formu-
lating the survey was that radio link failures would be the most common technical fault.  
 
Reports of battery and propeller/rotor failures made these fault types known before design-
ing the survey, but how common failure types these are was not known. The results show 
that batteries fail at around once every 1112 flights and propellers fail once every 915 
flights. This makes these failure types fairly uncommon when compared to the numbers of 
problems with radio links. The “other” fault category has a significant number or faults in 
it, but unfortunately there was no free text answer possible to explain further what types of 
faults fit under this heading. This was because of an attempt to try and keep the question-
naire short enough that operators would be willing to finish it. 
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Table 20 Numbers of technical faults by type 
Fault type n 
Percent of 
all faults 
Percent of all faults 
not including radio 
link failures 
1 fault / number 
of flights 
Fault in radio link 95 50.8 
 
163.9 
Fault in electric motor 6 3.2 6.5 2594.8 
Fault in combustion 
engine 0 0 0   
Fault in servo 5 2.7 5.4 3113.8 
Fault in propeller/rotor 17 9.1 18.5 915.8 
Fault in airframe 1 0.5 1.1 15569 
Fault in batteries 14 7.5 15.2 1112.1 
Fault in fuel supply 0 0 0   
Other 49 26.2 53.3 317.7 
TOTAL 187    
 
 
 
 
When looking at if the UA type affects the likelihood of technical failures we see that 
94.1% of technical faults are in helicopter type UA, while these types of aircraft represent 
85.2% out of all aircraft. This difference between failure rate and aircraft numbers is small 
and could easily be explained by the sample size. The numbers of aeroplane type UAS in 
this statistic is so small that no estimate of differing failure rates can be drawn from the 
survey. However, in further studies with more data there will likely at least be different 
types of typical faults for the UAS types. Fixed wing UAS are more suitable for long range 
BVLOS flights and this could affect the numbers of radio link faults or other faults that 
could differ because of the typical operations. 
 
 
Table 21 Faults by aircraft type 
Aircraft type n Percentage of all faults 
Helicopter/Multicopter 175.9 94.1% 
Aeroplane 11.1 5.9% 
Helicopter-Aeroplane Hybrid 0 0 
Airship 0 0 
Other 0 0 
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5.4 UAS crashes during 2016 
A fundamental question regarding unmanned aircraft safety is how often they crash. From 
all of the surveyed operators 50 answered that they had crashed their drones 69 times in 
total during 2016. This means that 23.9% of operators had crashes and on average UA are 
crashing once every 225.6 flights. This is a very meaningful number as it is one of the nec-
essary parts in a risk assessment and the other part is the severity of a UA colliding with a 
human. Severity has already been studied by multiple different groups (ASSURE, 2017) 
(Campolettano, 2017) and combining these results it is possible to calculate some rough 
estimates of risk when local population density and impact area are known. From this sur-
vey we can estimate that typical operators UAS will have around 3 years of average life 
span when calculated from average flights per year. 
 
Table 22 Did any of your aircraft crash during 2016? 
Yes No 
50 159 
23.9% 76.1% 
 
 
Operators who had crashes were also asked what caused the crashes and were the crashes 
controlled. The results are shown in Figure 12 and Table 23. Only a tiny minority an-
swered that the crashes were controlled. This was expected as most operators are using 
helicopter type UA and thus cannot glide back to a landing.  
 
 
Figure 12 Were the crashes controlled? 
 
Operators who had crashed their UA during 2016 answered that 52.8% of the crashes were 
caused by equipment malfunctions and 41.2% were caused by human error. Similar study 
(Graham Wild, 2017) estimated that 63% of UAS accidents are caused by technical faults, 
which is fairly close to the estimate from this questionnaire. These figures tell that increas-
ing pilot skills could reduce crashes significantly. When compared to manned aviation 
where approximately 90% of all crashes are caused by human error technical faults play a 
much larger role in UAS crashes. This could be expected as most UAS are not manufac-
tured to any standards and price competition is not encouraging manufacturers to invest in 
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reliability in the cheapest and most popular UA models. Third parties practically didn’t 
cause any crashes for the surveyed operators. 
 
 
Table 23 Causes of the crashes 
Human error 
Equipment 
malfunction Third party Other 
28.4 36.4 0.15 4.05 
41.2% 52.8% 0.2% 5.9% 
 
 
 
5.5 Operator viewpoints on regulations and future 
Operators were asked if they thought the regulation was easy to understand in a 3 point 
scale with the results shown in Figure 13. According to this survey most operators find the 
regulation easy to understand. Operators were able to clarify their choice with a free text 
answer and those answers were summarised and grouped. The most common complaints 
about the regulation were lack of or unclear definitions for crowd of people, densely popu-
lated area and aerial work. Also some complaints were not towards the clarity of the regu-
lation but the contents, with some wishing tougher regulation on hobbyists others wanting 
more lax insurance requirements. Multiple operators found the language of the regulation 
difficult to understand for persons that had no previous background in aviation. Operators 
expressed that they felt the regulation was unfairly lax for hobby pilots with more stringent 
requirements applied only for operators doing aerial work. Some also feared that a hobby 
pilot could cause an accident that would adversely affect the whole UAS market in Fin-
land. However, the unsatisfied viewpoints were in the minority with most of the operators 
feeling the current regulation was easy to understand. 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Is the regulation easy to understand? 
53 % 39 % 
6 % 
2 % 
Easy to understand
Partially easy to understand
Difficult to understand
I don't know
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The future outlook of the UAS market according to operators own perceptions was sur-
veyed with a 5 point scale from very positive to very negative. Operators were also given 
the possibility to clarify their answer in free text. Most operators 68% were either very 
positive or positive about their future. This shows that the UAS operators feel that the mar-
ket and industry is moving towards a more positive future and this was expectable as the 
number of operators is growing rapidly (Finnish Tranport Safety Agency, 2017). The free 
text clarifications cited positive experiences from the market growing or operators being 
able to perform their old jobs more effectively with the help of UAS. New possibilities 
were cited to have opened up in movie industry and city design because of the capabilities 
offered by UAS. Other operators told that surveying forests or providing situational aware-
ness in emergency situations had become much more efficient with the use of unmanned 
aircraft. 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Future outlook according to operators 
 
The negative future outlooks according to the text answers almost all were due to the fear 
of tighter future regulations making operations much more difficult, but some told of nega-
tive experiences from the market talking about excess of competition and hobbyists doing 
photography operations illegally without the required insurance. Many text answers even 
from operators with a positive future outlook stated that the fact that hobbyist had easier 
rules than commercial UAS operators felt unfair. Some of the answers asked for more re-
sponsibility for importers or shops selling UAS in informing hobbyists and manufacturers 
for designing safer UAS. Over all the market and regulation seems good from the opera-
tor’s point of view, but the uncertainty of future regulation changes was mostly causing the 
negative future outlooks. As Figure 14 shows the vast majority of operators have a positive 
outlook of future. 
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6 Evaluating risks 
 
From the gathered results we can evaluate some of the basic risks related to unmanned 
aviation in Finland. However, the data is missing all hobbyists and therefore is not repre-
sentative of all UAS flights in Finland. Also the risk to other aircraft cannot be evaluated 
from this study. Combining the reliability and accident data with collision test results from 
previous studies allows making crude estimations of local ground risk if population density 
and impact area can also be estimated. It is not possible to gather accurate enough flight 
location information through this type of a survey, but the possibility to gather accurate 
flight data could be possible from the new Droneinfo-mobile application published by 
Finnish Transport Safety Agency. The application has a function through which a flight 
notification can be made and these data points are gathered for future statistical analysis. 
Combining the reliability and crash probability estimates from this study to the flight noti-
fication data with a further mapping of population density, could yield a crude estimate of 
third party ground risk in Finland. However the ground risk estimate is impossible to be 
made only on the basis of this survey and the crash probability estimate is limited in its 
predictive value due to the sample lacking any hobbyists.   
6.1 Probability of a collision with other aircraft 
This study cannot provide an estimation of the air risk from UAS. The air risk should be 
evaluated from a reliable source of data or incident reports of sufficient quality. Current 
incident reports are not reliable as pilots report near misses with flying objects that can also 
be other objects than UAS. One method of estimating future numbers of near miss occur-
rences was to find out the numbers of Google searches for UAS internet shops (ATSB, 
2017). This is a good method of estimating future occurrence numbers, but it does not help 
to find out the severity of a mid-air collision. In future the coming EU-regulation will 
mandate electronic identification from a distance to be possible on all UAS of certain cate-
gories operated in EU with the U-Space system (SESAR Joint undertaking, 2017). After 
these systems are operational it will not only be possible to calculate a very accurate air 
risk estimate, but to actively alert UAS pilots of entering into airspace that is prohibited 
and to catch the users that violate rules. For now one possibility could be to do this type of 
air traffic analysis for manned aircraft around airports and draw maps of high risk areas 
where UAS flights would pose the highest risk. The simple empirical risk assessment from 
the world wide accident record must be that the probability of a collision is small and con-
centrated close to airports at lower altitudes.  
 
Severity of a collision between UAS and manned aircraft is still unknown and under re-
search. Without knowing the severity of impacts, assessing air risk for UAS is impossible. 
Compared to bird strike frequencies the UAS risk is much lower, but most of the worry is 
from the uncertainty of the severity and the growing reported incident rate. As the Virginia 
Techs simulation (Song, 2016) has estimated UAS are expected to cause more damage to 
aircraft than an equally sized bird in a collision. Still unknown is whether a common sized 
UA of around 1.4kg to 800g will cause catastrophic damage to a jet engine when ingested. 
No actual test of a jet engines tolerance to UAS impact has yet been performed, but this 
has been proposed by many. The problem is what type of a UAS should be tested and who 
would pay for this? Jet engines are extremely expensive and manufacturers are not willing 
to impose more design restrictions for themselves without an order from governments. 
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ASSURE research group has a project for evaluating UAS impacts (ASSURE, 2015) with 
manned aircraft and they are planning to at least conduct more simulations of impacts. 
 
One controversial study (BALPA, MAA, UK Department for Transport, 2016) attempting 
to quantify the severity of a mid-air collision between manned aircraft and UAS claimed 
that a UAS weighing around 1.2kg would not cause critical damage to a windscreen of an 
airliner, but a 4kg UAS would. This study is widely criticised for only releasing conclu-
sions and not providing any evidence for its claimed results. The opaque nature of the 
study with no methods or test data released combined with the fact that parties financing 
the research have vested interest against unmanned aviation, makes the claims of the study 
practically empty. The only possible conclusion from this study could be that the 1.2kg 
class UAS cannot cause critical damage to an airliners windscreen since these parties 
would have claimed so if they had any grounds to support the claim.  
 
Areas of high air traffic 
One way to estimate mid-air collision risk is through looking at the most likely collision 
areas in Finland. High traffic areas are the most likely places for a collision to take place, 
but emergency helicopters are also exceptionally vulnerable to collisions with UAS due to 
their lower flight altitudes and less stringent windscreen hardening requirements than 
commercial aeroplanes. Helicopter landing sites are not listed anywhere according to traf-
fic numbers, but hospitals and military bases are the most likely candidates for frequent 
traffic. Commercial aviation traffic from airports is reported on a regular basis and the 
most congested airport in Finland is Helsinki-Vantaa. Finland had in total 110954 air 
transport landings during 2016 and Helsinki-Vantaa EFHK airport had 82154 landings that 
year (Finavia, 2016). This is 74% of Finland’s total air traffic and means that the majority 
of Finland’s air traffic is taking place in the same county where 28% of all commercial 
UAS operators’ flights took place.  
 
The UAS flight concentration taken from professional pilots is a bad estimate to use for the 
air risk since the sample group is the most aware of the restrictions around airports and 
thus the least likely UAS user group to violate airport airspace. The hobbyists are consid-
ered to be the risk group that violates airport airspace due to not knowing the restrictions or 
ignoring them. However, it should be noted that traditional model airplane hobbyist are not 
considered to be a problem, but rather new UAS pilots that buy their aircraft from a shop 
and start flying without any training. The best estimate that can be made is that UAS flight 
numbers relate closely to the population size of the area and thus it is likely that Uusimaa 
is the busiest area also with hobbyist flights. As said before it is impossible to calculate the 
air risk based on this study, but simply looking at these statistics it is easy to say that in 
Finland the focus should be on Helsinki-Vantaa airport when it comes to air risk from 
UAS. Some form of a protective system around EFHK airport could prevent most of the 
possible mid-air collisions. The coming U-Space system will be able to deal with coopera-
tive UAS systems and take care of the problem, but will the system be implemented soon 
enough? 
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6.2 Probability of Technical failure 
Reliability of UAS is an important basic metric gathered from this study. During 2016 
26.8% of operators answered that their UAS experienced technical failures. This fraction 
makes sense when taking into account that the median for numbers of flights in a year was 
30 and the probability of experiencing a technical failure is once every 83.3 flights. Many 
operators fly so few times in a year that the yearly probability for technical failures is 
small. Slightly over half of the technical failures were data link problems which are not 
necessarily failures that will lead to a crash. The other two major failure modes were bat-
tery and propeller failures. The frequencies for battery and propeller faults were around 
once every 900 flights for propellers and around 1100 flights for batteries. Technical faults 
that fell under the category of other had a frequency of once every 317 flights.  
 
It is important to notice that many faults were hidden under the category “Other” and fur-
ther studies should aim to find out what types of technical faults fall under these unknown 
types of failures. The survey didn’t find a pronounced difference in reliability between 
helicopter and aeroplane type UAS. This is likely because of the small number of aero-
plane type UAS being used by the operators who participated in this survey and the re-
duced accuracy of the results when assessing aeroplane type UAS. To gain a better under-
standing of UAS technical failures, operators should be encouraged to report these inci-
dents regularly. Even if the faults are very minor such as a radio link loss or a faulty bat-
tery charge indication it would benefit the larger understanding of UAS reliability. Maybe 
in the future we can read technical reliability studies of UAS performed by consumer in-
formation magazines exactly like car magazines today. 
 
6.3 Probability of UAV falling on a person or property 
The general public is mostly worried of privacy violations or third party damages from 
UAS. The ground risk from small multicopters is not a very big concern since most of the 
unmanned aircraft in hobbyist use are very light weighing often around 1.2kg. Light 
weight multi-copters have a relatively low impact severity estimate based on recent colli-
sion tests (ASSURE, 2017) and (Campolettano, 2017). However, flights above crowds are 
seen as extremely risky due to the low reliability estimate of UAS on the market and the 
very high likelihood of hitting a person. Just as the new studies (ASSURE, 2017) 
(Campolettano, 2017) of impact severity have shown, there is significant risk involved 
when flying above a crowd with a UAS weighing around 3.1kg or more. Fortunately most 
of the UAS operators that reported having flown above crowds actually clarified that they 
had flown just next to a crowd and never directly on top of one. This shows good judge-
ment from the part of the operators that are hired to these types of jobs. From the data of 
this survey it was possible to calculate the correlations between reported technical failures 
and crashes. The Pearson correlations were calculated using SPSS software and the results 
are shown in Table 24.  
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I calculated the correlations between different types of technical faults and crashes, but 
none of the correlations was very strong. The highest correlations between crashes and 
faults are with propeller/rotor and battery failures. Both of these correlations are significant 
at the 0.01 level making the finding very reliable, but the actual correlations are not very 
strong. The fact that these two types of failures correlated stronger with crashes than radio 
link faults was not a surprise, but the actual amount of correlation is useful for anyone try-
ing to calculate probability of a given fault leading to a crash. If future surveys are con-
ducted with a similar method a more detailed technical fault categorisation should be used 
with the possibility given to participants to clarify answers in free text. 
 
 
Table 24 Correlations of technical faults to crashes 
 
Technical fault type Number of crashes 
Fault in radio link 
 
Pearson Correlation .142
*
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .020 
Fault in electric motor 
 
Pearson Correlation .043 
Sig. (1-tailed) .268 
Fault in combustion 
engine 
Pearson Correlation .
b
 
Sig. (1-tailed) . 
Fault in servo 
 
Pearson Correlation .130
*
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .030 
Fault in propeller/rotor 
 
Pearson Correlation .315
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 
Fault in airframe 
 
Pearson Correlation .171
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .007 
Fault in batteries 
 
Pearson Correlation .236
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 
Fault in fuel supply 
 
Pearson Correlation .
b
 
Sig. (1-tailed) . 
Other 
 
Pearson Correlation .084 
Sig. (1-tailed) .114 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
b. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
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6.4 The most risky type of aerial work with UAS 
One of the goals of this study was to find out what is the most risky type of aerial work 
with UAS. Correlations were calculated from the gathered data between numbers of aerial 
work flights, crashes and occurrences using SPSS. The only correlations that were signifi-
cant were powerline inspections that correlated with occurrences and test flights that corre-
lated with crashes. Even though these correlations are significant meaning trustworthy the 
strength of the correlations was weak. The fact that there were no more significant correla-
tions would suggest that there isn’t enough data gathered in this study to draw a definitive 
conclusion as to what type of aerial work is the most dangerous. Test flights are logically 
the most likely to end up in a crash, but with really no other aerial work types to compare 
to, the conclusion cannot be made in this study. 
 
Because the correlations between crashes and occurrences are not reliable enough to draw 
conclusions in this study, the only factor that can be known when comparing aerial work 
types is the location where the work is being done. The severity of possible consequences 
from a crash can be compared and by this metric flights directly above crowds of people 
are the most dangerous. This is not a statistically confirmed fact, but rather a logically ar-
gued statement. The fundamental difference between risks of operation with manned air-
craft and unmanned aircraft is the fact that a crash of a UAS does not necessarily cause any 
risk. The economic loss is of course important to the operator, but from the view point of 
total safety level nationwide, the fact that UAS are falling to the ground with no injuries to 
third parties is still a safe operation. 
Table 25 Correlations of aerial work types to crashes and occurrences 
Aerial work type Crashes Occurrences 
Photographing, videotaping Pearson Correlation -.098 .020 
Sig. (2-tailed) .158 .774 
Press, media Pearson Correlation .082 -.028 
Sig. (2-tailed) .240 .689 
Powerline inspection Pearson Correlation .010 .188
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .891 .006 
Gas pipe inspection Pearson Correlation .068 -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .325 .929 
Inspection of masts or wind power plants Pearson Correlation -.015 .115 
Sig. (2-tailed) .826 .097 
Inspection of buildings or roofs Pearson Correlation -.052 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .456 .975 
Inspection of other constructions, e.g. 
bridges 
Pearson Correlation -.040 -.022 
Sig. (2-tailed) .565 .746 
Logistics Pearson Correlation -.032 -.016 
Sig. (2-tailed) .646 .821 
Ship emission measurements Pearson Correlation .
b
 .
b
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
Measurement of radiation or other emis-
sions 
Pearson Correlation .
b
 .
b
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
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Measurement of mobile phone networks 
or other telecommunication networks 
Pearson Correlation -.053 .029 
Sig. (2-tailed) .446 .676 
Agricultural work Pearson Correlation -.078 -.035 
Sig. (2-tailed) .262 .612 
Forestry work Pearson Correlation .025 .008 
Sig. (2-tailed) .721 .907 
Providing an overall situation picture for 
an entity in command of other operations 
Pearson Correlation .094 -.009 
Sig. (2-tailed) .178 .903 
Aircraft external inspections Pearson Correlation .068 -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .325 .929 
Mapping or charting Pearson Correlation -.055 -.016 
Sig. (2-tailed) .430 .819 
Lidar or other sensor Pearson Correlation .068 .019 
Sig. (2-tailed) .325 .780 
Test flights for development of new de-
vices or functions 
Pearson Correlation .268
**
 -.016 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .822 
Search and rescue services Pearson Correlation .097 .090 
Sig. (2-tailed) .161 .197 
Surveillance Pearson Correlation -.017 -.023 
Sig. (2-tailed) .807 .742 
Ore prospecting or other soil survey Pearson Correlation .
b
 .
b
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . 
Scientific research Pearson Correlation .025 -.016 
Sig. (2-tailed) .721 .813 
Tasks using a thermographic camera Pearson Correlation -.019 .113 
Sig. (2-tailed) .780 .102 
RPAS flight training Pearson Correlation .039 -.020 
Sig. (2-tailed) .575 .770 
Other 
 
Pearson Correlation -.020 -.032 
Sig. (2-tailed) .776 .642 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
b. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
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7 Conclusions 
 
This study set out to clarify what types of activity UAS operators are actually conducting 
in Finland for the first time at least to my or Finnish Transport Safety Agency’s 
knowledge. The study was only possible after the first Finnish regulation on remotely pi-
loted aircraft became active during the latter part of year 2015 and required commercial 
operators to register. The statistics gathered of general UAS operations around Finland in 
this study have given the first concrete look at the industry. Simply the knowledge of what 
is being done, where and how much, has cleared much of the unknowns around UAS oper-
ations in Finland. The finding that UAS flight hour distribution is closely related to the 
population distribution is a finding that can be used to estimate total UAS activity in Fin-
land and to plan the use of Aviation authority’s resources. After all, it makes little sense to 
focus on air risk around airports that are located in regions with very limited numbers of 
flight activity while Helsinki-Vantaa airport sees three quarters of the manned air transport 
aviation in Finland and the capital region an estimated one quarter of unmanned aviation. 
 
The general statistics of numbers of UAS operated, flight numbers and flight hours give a 
picture of the typical operator as a small scale business doing photography or filming with 
the occasional help of a UAS. In this survey it was estimated that during 2016 there were 
949 active UAS operators in Finland. The general statistics show that the entry level of 
starting UAS operations is low for people coming from outside of traditional aviation and 
the use of new tools such as UAS can be experimented on and adopted easily to a wide 
range of applications. Larger scale operators were a minority, but they conducted a sizea-
ble proportion of all flights. After photographing the most common aerial work types in 
order were mapping, test flights, media and search and rescue services. The fact that test 
flights are third most common type of UAS activity would suggest that in future there will 
be completely new operations and manufacturers in Finland. Largest of operators partici-
pating in this survey were flying hundreds of times a year doing more complicated types of 
aerial work such as power line inspections in BVLOS. A small surprise was the fact that 
power line survey was not more common as air space reservations for this type of activity 
have caused a lot of workload to Finnish aviation authority. 
 
The biggest limitation of this survey is the sampled population. The fact that all hobbyists 
are excluded from the sample significantly limits the generalizability of this study. It is 
unfortunate that there are very few ways of reliably contacting or identifying hobby users 
of unmanned aircraft. Until registration will be necessary also for hobbyist a large portion 
of UAS users possibly even the largest group will be operating so that the aviation authori-
ty will have very little information of their activities. One possible way of spreading in-
formation to hobbyists would be to demand shops that sell UAS to give out information 
leaflets with every sold aircraft. This would alleviate some of the risk from users that are 
ignorant of the current rules, but still it would not make gathering of data possible. A sec-
ond idea of a method for gathering information of hobbyist activities in Finland would be 
to increase the numbers of Droneinfo mobile application users and start conducting statisti-
cal analysis of the flight notifications made through the application. With time eventually 
new EU regulations will make registration of hobbyists also mandatory and then better 
statistical analyses can be conducted of UAS operations not just in Finland but in Europe. 
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A major unknown factor of safety has been the reliability of UAS and numbers of occur-
rences. In this study an estimate for both of these questions was given from the gathered 
answers. For all of the operators participating in this study, technical faults happened once 
every 83.3 flights. This estimate includes radio link failures that accounted for around 50% 
of all the faults. This estimate is useful also for operators and hobbyist when estimating the 
running cost of a UAS. The numbers of crashes that operators reported amounted to one 
crash every 225.6 flights. This is a very important statistic when evaluating any UAS oper-
ations risk. Before this study, there was no estimate of UAS crash probability based on 
data that could have been used for example when the current Finnish regulation was draft-
ed. During this study’s literature review no study came across that would have given an 
estimate for commercial UAS crash probability. It will be interesting to compare numbers 
when other studies come up with new estimates for crash probability and what techniques 
those studies will have used to form the estimate. 
 
In this survey, accidents, incidents and occurrences were asked separately from crashes and 
an estimate of 160 accidents, 140 incidents and1700 occurrences can be given for the year 
2016. This is a projection to all of the estimated 949 active operators and using an estimate 
of 70690 total UAS flights during 2016. It should be noted that of the reported occurrences 
control link losses were the dominating type with a proportion of 73.4%. Using the occur-
rence data results in estimates of accidents happening once every 420 flights, incident once 
every 486 flights and occurrences once every 40 flights. This shows that crashes, accidents 
and technical faults estimates are in conflict and this could be a result of operators under-
standing the definitions differently. The survey was designed with some overlapping ques-
tions so that the previous answers could be verified by a later one. It is unfortunate that the 
answers differ from one to the next slightly but using a conservative approach choosing 
always the least reliable or safe estimate can be done if this study’s estimates are used in 
other works. The results of crash and occurrence probabilities are significant and very use-
ful in any risk assessments of UAS operations. Finding out what is the riskiest type of aeri-
al work proved to be unachievable from the gathered data due to a lack of reliability for 
most aerial work types. If this study is turned to a longitudinal one the additional data 
could be used to answer this question later. The only reliable correlations between crashes 
and aerial work flight hours were for test flights and powerline inspections. Since these 
were the only two reliable correlations determining more aerial work types reliably for a 
comparison is needed. 
 
My recommendation for future research on the basis of this study is turning this question-
naire into a longitudinal study. The survey should be improved in questions asking tech-
nical faults, accidents and crashes. These topics should be inquired in more detail while the 
division of flights around Finland and to different aerial work types could be made easier 
to answer or separated to another questionnaire. A longitudinal study could identify trends 
in unmanned aviation that could be then taken into account when aviation authority is pre-
paring plans for inspections or simply spreading information. The primary recommenda-
tion from this thesis is not for any research but for an action to improve safety of UAS 
flights in Finland. Whatever they are called drones, UAS or model aircraft, all shops sell-
ing these systems should always handout information leaflets with content on safe flying 
rules and places to find more information. This simple action would make sure that the 
large new hobbyist group stays informed of the necessary flying rules.   
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Appendix 1. Introductionary letter to survey in English 
 
 
Dear unmanned aviation operator 
 
My name is Henri Hohtari and I am currently finishing my master’s in Aalto-university 
School of Engineering. As part of my master’s thesis I created a questionnaire of un-
manned aviation in Finland during 2016 in co-operation with Finnish Transport Safety 
Agency Trafi. The purpose of the questionnaire is to find out the realities of unmanned 
aircraft operations in Finland. This clarification of the big picture is very valuable to 
Trafi and the development of unmanned aviation. 
 
Answering the questionnaire requires approximately 10 to 15 minutes of your time. The 
questions regard general statistics of your unmanned operations in Finland during the 
year 2016. All participants to the questionnaire will remain anonymous to ensure that 
you can answer honestly even about negative incidents and experiences without fear of 
consequences. Please, do not write your name to any of the open text answers to ensure 
your identity stays hidden. The results of the survey will be published in my master’s 
thesis at the Aaltodoc publication library and I will send a copy of the thesis to Trafi.  
If you decide to participate in the survey, please try to answer the questions honestly up 
to your best knowledge. Participation in the questionnaire is voluntary and you can 
abort answering at any point. 
 
Thank you for the time you are using for my master’s thesis. The results will be utilized 
in Trafi to develop authority services and functions. Your email address was taken from 
Trafi’s unmanned aviation operator register and the addresses will not be given to any 
parties outside of Trafi. Your email will only be used for this message and one reminder 
letter.  
 
If you want to ask something regarding the questionnaire from me personally, you can 
contact me by email. 
 
Best Regards 
Henri Hohtari 
 
 
Link to the questionnaire 
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Unmanned aviation in Finland during 2016 
 
  
Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
 
